Who are the Russian saboteurs working with Ukraine?
Two Russian men have described their separate roles supporting Ukraine's GUR. Ivan operates inside Russia, conducting surveillance of military sites and preparing locations for drone components. Foma lives in exile in Poland and directs a network of volunteers who gather information on high-ranking Russian officers. The GUR has confirmed both men work for the agency. Ivan previously belonged to the political opposition in Russia. Foma claims prior elite connections that supply him with contacts and data on military locations.
How do the networks conduct surveillance and attacks?
Ivan reports hiding drone parts near airfields and military factories before strikes. He sent video evidence of one such cache to the documentary maker. Foma trains volunteers online on methods to follow targets without detection, including instructions to leave phones behind. Targets receive files containing photos, vehicle details and schedules. Foma states his group verifies each proposed target before accepting the task. After the December 2025 killing of Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov, Foma confirmed his network had supplied information on the officer.
Verification limits on specific claims
The GUR handler stated uncertainty about the reliability of any single operative. [TO VERIFY: exact involvement of Ivan in the June 2025 Yelabuga factory incident, as this rests on Foma's independent checks rather than direct confirmation.] Both men avoid sharing advance plans. The GUR acknowledges it lacks a complete picture of all activities.
What risks do the operatives face inside Russia?
Ivan described a vehicle search while carrying handmade explosives, an event that could have led to terrorism charges and long imprisonment. He states there is no fixed group structure to reduce the chance of collective arrest. Foma warns that any online group chat or repeated meetings would likely result in rapid detention. Most ideological participants have either left Russia or been imprisoned, according to Ivan. Remaining support often comes from paid individuals or unwitting carriers such as lorry drivers.
Why do these individuals oppose the current Russian government?
Both men state opposition to the war in Ukraine and to President Vladimir Putin's leadership. Ivan believes the regime could fall if the war is lost and that their actions aim to accelerate that outcome. Foma argues that military figures responsible for actions in Ukraine must face consequences. He describes mapping storage sites, units and homes of strategic bomber pilots to identify weak points in the system.
Frequently asked questions
How many Russians are estimated to work with the GUR?
Foma estimates 300-500 people. This figure cannot be independently verified and the GUR does not provide its own count.
Does Ukraine officially claim responsibility for the attacks?
Ukraine does not officially admit responsibility for targeted operations inside Russia. A Ukrainian intelligence officer previously confirmed involvement in one specific killing to the BBC.
Are civilians targeted in these operations?
Both men state that civilian harm is avoided. Ivan emphasises selection of military assets only.
Where does Foma's network operate?
Volunteers are based inside Russia, with additional support from people in Ukraine and other European countries who track digital footprints.
Can the claims be fully confirmed?
Many details remain unverified. The GUR notes it cannot know the full picture, and both men limit the information they share.
Key takeaways
Two named Russian men have described support roles for Ukraine's GUR inside Russia. Surveillance focuses on military officers and facilities linked to the war. Foma's network supplies intelligence but does not carry out attacks itself. Risks include arrest on terrorism charges carrying decades-long sentences. The GUR confirms the men's affiliation yet cannot verify every reported action. Numbers of participants and specific operational details remain unconfirmed.
Conclusion
The accounts provide rare first-hand descriptions of support networks operating inside Russia for Ukraine's intelligence service. They illustrate the use of remote training, compartmentalised structures and selective targeting of military assets. At the same time, the GUR's own statements underline the limits of verification. The activities form part of a wider pattern of drone strikes and reported assassinations acknowledged in general terms by Ukrainian authorities since 2022, though individual claims require independent corroboration that is not currently available.
